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This research addresses interagency coordination from an architectural 
perspective utilizing a systems engineering process. Interagency coordination 
is not fully understood and has proven diffi cult for various U.S. government 
agencies to replicate. Two examples of successful interagency coordination are 
used in this analysis: the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) and 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) high-value target teams. These organizations are 
decomposed into their top-level functions and organized by their major physical 
components. These results are applied in the creation of a notional top-level 
functional and physical architecture for the U.S. European Command’s new Joint 
Interagency Counter-Traffi cking Center (JICTC).  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Established by the National 
Security Act of 1947 and Title 
10 of the United States Code, 
Combatant Commands (COCOM) 
provide command and control of 
U.S. Armed Forces in different 
regions around the world (Executive 
Offi ce of the President, 2008, p. 1). 
They are responsible for “utilizing 
and integrating air, land, sea, and 
amphibious forces under their 
commands to achieve U.S. national 
security objectives while protecting 
national interests” [1]. As the 
primary executors of military policy 
abroad, COCOMs therefore play an 
important role in foreign policy. This 
requires them to interact with other 
Executive Branch agencies whose 
responsibilities intersect with those 
of the military [2]. This coordination 
between the different agencies has 
proven to be challenging.   
In an attempt to address these 
needed improvements in interagency 
coordination, in 2010, U.S. European 
Command (USEUCOM) created the 
Joint Interagency Counter-Traffi cking 
Center (JICTC). JICTC’s mission 
is to support the synchronization of 
interagency efforts to counter illicit 
traffi cking in four main mission 
areas: narcotics, terrorism, weapons 
of mass destruction, and human 
traffi cking. The desired end state is 
to disrupt these traffi cking networks 
and make the USEUCOM area of 
responsibility (AOR) inhospitable to 
them [3].
This research develops a 
generalized functional and physical 
architecture for the JICTC using 
a Systems Engineering approach. 
These architectures are developed in 
order to provide a template for the 
replication of successful interagency 
coordination for the JICTC based 
upon the successful interagency 
efforts of Joint Interagency Task 
Force-South (JIATF-South) and the 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
high-value target teams. In order to 
more clearly understand the JIATF 
and SOF organizations, this research 
also develops notional functional and 
physical architectures for JIATF and 
SOF high-value target teams, as well 
as applying Systems Engineering 
methods to better understand their 
operational perspective and system 
boundaries through the development 
of external systems diagrams.  
Tracing its beginnings back 
to the 1980s, JIATF-South has 
become the standard to which all 
other interagency organizations 
are compared [4]. This integrated 
team is composed of members from 
the U.S. armed services, federal 
law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, and partner nations. During 
the surge of American forces in Iraq 
in 2007, SOF utilized interagency 
teams to better identify, track, and 
defeat the insurgency. These high-
value target teams were composed 
of military members and civilian 
personnel from a wide variety of 
government agencies as well as 
contracting companies.
The Systems Engineering 
Process used in this article follows 
the method outlined by Dennis 
Buede in The Engineering Design of 
Systems: Models and Methods (2nd 
ed.)(2009). The general outline of 
the Buede process is to develop an 
operational concept, defi ne system 
architectures, and integrate the 
architectures together [5].
An operational concept is “a 
vision for what the system is, a 
statement of mission requirements, 
and a description of how the system 
will be used” [6]. By describing 
how the system will be used, the 
operational concept begins to outline 
the system’s context and interactions 
with other external systems. 
The functional architecture is a 
hierarchical model of the functions 
performed by a system. This is 
accomplished by a decomposition 
of the top-level functions of the 
system. This decomposition is used 
to identify components and the fl ow 
of inputs and outputs that can satisfy 
the system requirements. 
The various components identifi ed 
in the functional architecture are 
further defi ned in the physical 
architecture. Here, all of the 
resources for every function are 
identifi ed. However, the descriptions 
are given in generic terms without 
any specifi cations or performance 
characteristics.   
The results of the three previous 
processes all come together in the 
allocated architecture. The allocated 
architecture is the integration of the 
requirements decomposition with the 
functional and physical architectures. 
This research does not include 
the development of an allocated 
architecture.
2. BACKGROUND
The need for improved 
understanding of interagency 
coordination is apparent in today’s 
world. No single government 
organization has the resources, ability, 
or the authority to adequately address 
every mission area. The mechanisms 
for utilizing the respective agencies 
with appropriate mission and 
area expertise is the backbone of 
interagency coordination and it needs 
to be better understood.
2.1. Interagency Handbook
The objective of a recent publication 
was to provide a resource for wide 
dissemination that would improve 
communication and information 
sharing shortcomings in interagency 
training [7]. This handbook is 
designed to provide an introduction to 
interagency coordination as well as best 
practices to implement it successfully 
on the operational level. These best 
practices were identifi ed through 
the combination of an online survey, 
interviews, site visits, and literature 
reviews. These best practices include 
getting the right people on the team, 
providing adequate resources, and 
breaking down barriers to information 
sharing.
2.2. Joint Interagency Task Force-
South
An objective of a recently 
published case study was to examine 
how JIATF-South functions. The 
case study identifi ed performance 
variables while evaluating the success 
of JIATF-South [8]. The analysis of 
these variables helped to identify 
several key characteristics that were 
essential to successful interagency 
coordination at JIATF-South. The 
following highlights four of these 
variables from the case study:
1. Purpose 
JIATF-South is focused on 
illicit traffi cking in the Western 
Hemisphere. Most of the interagency 
and partner nation illicit traffi cking 
information is focused on one aspect 
of combating illegal traffi cking – 
narcotics, specifi cally cocaine.
2. Empowerment
JIATF-South is given the 
authority and resources that it 
needs to accomplish its mission. 
By deriving authority from both the 
Congressional and Executive Branch, 
JIATF-South not only has the money 
but also the physical assets (planes, 
ships, etc.) to produce positive 
results. Additionally, the different 
organizational liaisons within JIATF-
South are empowered to make 
decisions that commit the resources 
of their parent organization. 
3. Support 
JIATF-South receives support 
from a number of military and federal 
institutions, including Combatant 
Commands, U.S. Coast Guard, Drug 
Enforcement Agency, Customs 
and Border Protection, and others. 
Most notably, JIATF-South does not 
take credit for any drug seizures. 
Instead, it gives the credit to partner 
organizations, knowing that in turn, 
they will continue to support JIATF-
South.
4. Structure 
JIATF-South is organized into 
different departments based on 
similar tasks performed (intelligence, 
operations, logistics, etc.). The 
adverse impact of frequent turnover 
of agency and military personnel is 
moderated/mitigated by a force of 
long-term civilians. 
2.3. High-Value Target Teams
National Defense University 
recently published a case study on the 
use of interagency teams by Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) in Iraq [9]. 
The objective was to provide unique 
insight to interagency coordination in 
a combat setting, focusing on these 
three variables:
1.Network-based targeting
Terrorists, insurgent cells, and 
their close supporters were analyzed 
and tracked in order to attack them 
with precision to minimize collateral 
damage. 
2.Fusion of intelligence and 
operations
By collocating intelligence and 
operations groups together, any break 
between information analysis and 
action was eliminated. This resulted 
in better decision making and quicker 
prosecution of high-value targets.
3.Counterinsurgency integration
The intelligence-fusion cells 
and high-value target teams located 
themselves in closer proximity to the 
enemy network. This reduced the 
cycle time in which new information 
was analyzed to identify new targets. 
3. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Before any system can be 
decomposed into its top-level 
functions, the mission requirements 
and purpose of the system must 
fi rst be understood. This is done by 
creating an operational concept of 
the system. This operational concept 
is the framework of how the system 
interacts with other external systems 
in the form of inputs and outputs. 
3.1. JIATF-South
JIATF-South serves as the hub for 
intelligence fusion and coordination 
of interagency organizations and 
partner nations. As a result, the other 
organizations participating in the 
interagency process are defi ned as 
partners, not subordinate agencies 
under the command of JIATF-South.
Interactions between the proposed 
system and external systems are 
represented by need lines as shown 
in the External Systems Diagram in 
Figure 1. 
Each line describes an input to or 
output from the system. The process
Figure 1: JIATF-South System Interaction
by which input are transformed 
into outputs facilitates the desired 
outcomes of the system. U.S. Southern 
Command (USSOUTHCOM): JIATF-
South is a national task force assigned 
to  Commander, USSOUTHCOM. Its 
funding, as well as training support 
and facilities, comes from DoD 
through USSOUTHCOM.
U.S. Armed Services: The armed 
services provide the major hardware 
needed to support JIATF-South and 
its partner organizations. Since the 
military is restricted from directly 
participating in law enforcement 
activities, they assist in a supporting 
role under the tactical control of 
JIATF-South.
Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies: Federal law enforcement 
agencies have the authority and 
mandates to fi nd, arrest, and 
prosecute drug smugglers. JIATF-
South is the lead in facilitating 
open collaboration and coordination 
between all the individual agencies 
and for all detection and monitoring 
operations.
Intelligence Agencies: 
Intelligence gathered for JIATF-
South comes from U.S. and partner 
nation law enforcement, other 
federal intelligence agencies, or 
the intelligence branches of the 
respective U.S. and partner nation 
military branches. 
Partner Nations: Partner nations 
provide ships and aircraft to be 
employed under the direct tactical 
control of JIATF-South. They 
provide law enforcement intelligence 
to U.S. law enforcement agencies, 
which directly supports JIATF-
South’s detection and monitoring 
efforts. They also provide access to 
sovereign territory. 
3.2. SOF High-Value Targets
The SOF high-value target 
teams demonstrated success in Iraq 
using organizations and tactics 
capable of conducting classic 
counterinsurgency warfare. These 
teams used interagency innovations 
such as network-based targeting 
and the fusion of intelligence with 
operational capability.
Interactions between the proposed 
system, which includes the SOF 
high-value target teams, and external 
systems are represented by need lines 
as shown in the External Systems 
Diagram seen in Figure 2. Each line 
describes an input to or output from 
the system. The process by which 
inputs are transformed into outputs 
facilitates the desired outcomes of 
the system.
Figure 2: SOF High Value Target Team System Interaction
U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM): The 
funding and personnel management 
for the SOF high-value target teams 
is provided by USSOCOM. They 
ensure that the teams have all the 
resources needed to accomplish their 
missions. Additionally, by reporting 
to a separate chain of command, 
the SOF teams bypass traditional 
communication channels, ensuring 
that operations are not hindered by 
bureaucratic delays.
Conventional Military Forces: 
The military services, specifi cally the 
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 
provide additional manpower and 
security to the SOF high-value teams. 
These forces are close by should 
the need for reinforcements arise. 
Additionally, once the area is cleared 
by SOF teams, the conventional
forces remain behind to provide 
security to the local population and 
continue the nation building process.
Intelligence Agencies: Intelligence 
gathered for the SOF high-value 
target teams primarily comes from 
either federal intelligence agencies 
or the intelligence branches of the 
respective military branches and 




In its most basic defi nition, a 
function is a process that takes an 
input and transforms it into an output. 
It is from the functional architecture 
that one can view the fl ow of inputs 
and outputs throughout the system. 
Functional decomposition, also 
known as top-down structuring, starts 
with the top-level system functions 
and partitions them into several sub 
functions [10]. 
The application of functional 
decompositions to JIATF-South and 
the SOF high-value target teams allows 
for the identifi cation of key functions 
that are important in regards to 
successfully executing interagency 
coordination. Based on the mission 
and requirements of the JICTC, the 
relevant functions from JIATF-South 
and SOF high-value target teams 
are modifi ed and used to create the 
functional architecture of the JICTC. 
4.1. JIATF-South
The proposed top-level function of 
JIATF-South is to “Conduct Counter 
Illicit Traffi cking Interagency/Partner 
Nation Coordination In Support of 
Law Enforcement”. This encompasses 
Its entire mission, beginning with 
receiving actionable law enforcement 
information, compiling a case using 
interagency resources, deciding to 
commit interagency resources, and 
engaging in detection and monitoring 
operations. This top-level function is 
decomposed into six lower functions. 
Each of these proposed sub functions 
follow a progressive fl ow of inputs 
and outputs.
4.1.1.Understand Mission/Purpose
By sharply defi ning and 
understanding their mission, 
JIATF-South and its partners can 
concentrate all of their efforts and 
resources to accomplishing it. 
The lack of ambiguity in what the 
organization has been tasked to do 
gives it direction. The sub-functions 
are described below.
Defi ne and Scope the Mission: 
The defi nition and scope of the 
mission needs to be clear. The focus 
of JIATF-South activities should 
not take neither a too narrow nor 
too broad of a look. There is always 
a limited amount of resources 
provided by partners that must be 
used effectively.
Conceptualize the Desired End 
State:  JIATF-South's desired end 
state should be defi ned and known to 
all partners in order that all activities 
will be conducted in support of 
achieving it.
4.1.2. Conduct Intel Cycle
Intelligence drives operations 
at JIATF-South. Raw intelligence 
is gathered from a wide variety of 
sources, especially law enforcement 
human intelligence where it is 
processed and analyzed at JIATF-
South in order to determine if there 
is enough information to attempt an 
intercept. This function is further 
described below.
Process Intelligence: The 
translation, evaluation, and collation 
of raw intelligence materials is 
necessary prior to any detailed 
analysis.
Analyze Intelligence: Analysis 
establishes the signifi cance 
and implications of processed 
intelligence, integrates it with 
previous information, and interprets 
the signifi cance of any newly 
developed knowledge. 
Disseminate Intelligence: The 
fi nished intelligence product is 
distributed to decision maker and 
relevant response forces for them to 
determine the next course of action 
or to take action.
Exploit Intelligence: New 
intelligence leads relevant to the 
mission that are discovered during the 
course of analysis are noted for future 
intelligence gathering operations.
4.1.3. Share Resources
JIATF-South never receives all 
of the resources that it requests from 
its partners each year. As a result, it 
has to fi nd a way to make its limited 
resources work effi ciently and 
effectively. The sub-functions are 
below:
Create Plans for Resource 
Allocation: Resources need to be 
utilized both effi ciently and effectively 
based on effi cient planning.
Prioritize the Different Needs for 
Resources: The allocation of more 
limited resources will be done on a 
priority basis. Certain missions will 
need to be designated as a higher 
priority than others.
Coordinate Resource Allocation: 
The movement of resources will need 
to be coordinatedwith the respective 
parent agency/partner nation.
4.1.4. Promote Collaboration
Partners are attracted to JIATF-
South as they know that they can 
accomplish more by working with 
JIATF-South than they can by 
working independently. The sub-
functions are:
Promote Networking of 
Information: JIATF-South establishes 
lines of communication so that 
information can be shared effi ciently 
and effectively with all partners.
Nurture Long Term Relationships: 
The majority of the collaborative 
relationships between JIATF-South 
and its partners are built upon trust. 
Attributes such as transparency, 
respect, and politeness are all 
conducive of trust. 
Fuse Intelligence with 
Operations: By having actionable 
intelligence drive operations, the 
JIATF-South Intelligence and 
Operations Directorates will need to 
be able to communicate with each 
other rapidly.
4.1.5. Make Effective Decisions
Decision making at JIATF-South 
is done by consensus among partner 
agencies and nations. The resultant 
clash of diverse backgrounds and 
viewpoints is encouraged. The 
thorough debate and reconciliation of 
dissenting views is time consuming 
but ultimately improves the entire 
decision making process. The sub-
functions are listed below.
Receive/Generate Operational 
Plans: The JIATF-South command 
team will receive day-to-day and 
sometimes minute-to-minute 
operational plans that were prepared 
jointly by the Intelligence and 
Operations Directorates. New plans 
will be generated as necessary. 
Empower Organizational 
Offi cers:  Liaison offi cers from partner 
agencies should/must be empowered 
by their parent organization to make 
decisions that commit their agencies 
to action. 
Encourage Diverse Viewpoints: 
The diverse viewpoints at JIATF-
South should promote and resolve 
“productive confl ict” that improves 
the overall decision making process.
Achieve Consensus for Decision: 
Decisions should be made by 
consensus with all dissenting views 
being heard, openly considered, and 
resolved.
4.1.6. Improve Organization
Constant self-assessment of 
JIATF-South is important as it 
must be able to adapt and improve 
its operations quickly in order 
to continue to be effective in its 
mission. The sub-functions and their 
descriptions are listed below.
Review and Accept Feedback: 
JIATF-South must continually 
seek, and review, feedback on how 
it conducts its intelligence and 
operations missions, and develop 
subsequent improvements.
Implement Improvements to 
Organization: Improvements that 
have been developed need to be 
implemented in a timely manner.
4.2. SOF High-Value 
Target Teams
The proposed top-level function 
of SOF High-Value Target Teams 
is to “Conduct Counter Insurgency 
Interagency Coordination and 
Operations”. This function 
encompasses the entire mechanism 
utilized by the high-value target 
teams to identify, track, and defeat 
terrorists and insurgent networks. 
This top-level function can be 
decomposed into four sub functions. 
Each of these proposed sub functions 




The sharply defi ned purpose 
held by high-value target teams 
gave them a unifi ed direction and 
prevented individual organizations 
from straying and concentrating on 
its own goals and missions. The sub-
functions are summarized below.   
Communicate Desired End State: 
The knowledge of the desired end 
state needs to be known by everyone 
involved in the high-value target 
teams.
Commit to Achieve Desired End 
State: All members of the high-value 
target teams need to recognized 
their place in achieving the desired 
end state and ensure that all of their 
actions are in line with supporting it.
4.2.2. Conduct Network-Based 
Targeting
Intelligence was the key to the 
specifi c targeting of terrorist and 
insurgent cells. SOF high-value 
target teams relied on intelligence to 
provide situational awareness of the 
local environment, social networks, 
key decision makers, and their 
motivations. From this, they could 
determine where and when it was 
best to conduct operations against a 
target for maximum effectiveness. 
This process is detailed below.
Find and Fix Target for Intelligence 
Collection: High-value target teams 
need a starting point for intelligence 
collection. The start point can be 
deliberate or opportunity based, and 
can focus on a known personality, 
a facility, an organization, or some 
other type of signature.
Conduct Operations Against 
Target: High-value target teams shall 
conduct successful operations against 
enemy targets. 
Exploit Captured Intelligence 
from Operations: The process of 
examining, analyzing, interrogating, 
and processing captured enemy 
personnel, equipment, and material 
for intelligence purposes 
Analyze Newly Gathered 
Intelligence: Information gained 
from exploitation is turned into 
intelligence which can be used to 
drive new operations. 
Disseminate New Intelligence: 
Any intelligence information 
collected from operations is 
disseminated widely throughout 
the intelligence enterprise to help 
eliminate intelligence stovepipes.
4.2.3. Fuse Intelligence with 
Operational Capability
By bridging the gap between 
intelligence and operational 
capability, high-value target teams 
were able to place targets under 
constant surveillance. This persistent 
coverage of a target resulted in 
improved discrimination and lessened 
the chance of the target escaping. 
Share Resources: Each partner 
brings unique skills and resources to 
the organization that need to be used 
effi ciently and effectively.
Promote Collaboration: High-
value target teams need to advocate 
the need for partners to coordinate 
and collaborate with each other. No 
one agency has all of the resources 
or information to accomplish the 
mission.
Make Informed Decisions: 
High-value target teams need to 
make informed decisions based on 
collaboration of intelligence analysts 
and SOF operators.
4.2.4. Improve Organization
As high-value target teams 
gained valuable experience, it was 
important that they took the lessons 
learned and applied them right away. 
This understanding contributed to 
their continuous improvement. The 
derived sub-functions are below.
Accept Organizational Feedback: 
High-value target teams must 
continually seek feedback on how it 
conducts intelligence and operations 
missions.
Review Feedback: High-value 
target teams will analyze and review 
feedback (lessons learned) in order 
to develop improvements that 
address any identifi ed shortcomings 
or ineffi ciencies.
Implement Feedback: 
Improvements that have been 
developed need to be implemented 
in a timely manner.
4.3. JICTC 
An objective of this research 
is to establish both JIATF-South 
and the SOF high-value target 
teams as examples of organizations 
that successfully implemented 
interagency coordination, and 
subsequently develop functional and 
physical architectures based on those 
organizations. These architectures are 
then used to develop architectures for 
USEUCOM’s JICTC. However, there 
are several unique characteristics 
of JICTC that differentiate its 
organizational structure and mission 
tasking from both JIATF-South and 
the SOF high-value target teams.
As outlined in its design concept, 
the JICTC’s mission is to “support 
U.S. interagency efforts to counter 
illicit traffi cking and terrorism and 
assist focus nations in building self-
suffi cient counter traffi cking skills, 
competencies, and capacity” [11]. 
The primary goal of the JICTC is to 
promote and support the following 
three objectives:
1. Increase disruption of 
traffi cking networks internally and 
regionally.  Currently, the U.S. 
supports programs to enhance 
border security, provide support to 
foreign law enforcement, and protect 
the integrity of partner nations. 
These programs are administered 
by a multitude of federal agencies 
which provides the possibility for 
duplication and redundancy of efforts. 
The JICTC intends to assist in the 
coordination and synchronization of 
these international capacity building 
efforts.
2. Identify, and discuss with 
partners, new interagency and 
international capacity building efforts. 
Acting as a central node, the JICTC 
will ensure that there is appropriate 
interagency and international 
coordination for different projects 
and counter-traffi cking efforts. 
3.  Increase information sharing, 
both internally and regionally, to 
counter traffi cking and to insure 
cross-border management. The 
JICTC will seek to establish a regional 
standard for information sharing 
with USEUCOM components and 
international partners.
Based on this design concept, 
the proposed top-level function of 
the JICTC is “Conduct Interagency 
Coordination In Support of Efforts 
to Counter Illicit Traffi cking”. This 
function highlights the JICTC’s 
mission of complementing existing 
international programs and assisting 
the international community to build 
self-suffi cient national capabilities 
to counter illicit traffi cking. The 
previous functional decompositions 
of JIATF-South and SOF High-Value 
Target teams are used to develop 
specifi c sub functions that are still 
applicable to the JICTC’s mission. 




This function is very similar to 
the ones found in the JIATF-South 
and SOF high-value target team 
decomposition. All the partners 
involved in the JICTC need to 
completely comprehend its purpose 
and mission in order to participate 
effi ciently and effectively in the 
organization. This is further described 
below.
Defi ne the Mission: The mission 
of JICTC needs to be clearly 
defi ned. Any ambiguity in what it is 
designed to do will not help it and 
its partners achieve their respective 
organizational goals.
Conceptualize Desired End State: 
JICTC's desired end state should be 
defi ned and known to all partners 
in order that all activities will be 
conducted in support of achieving it.
4.3.2. Promote Collaboration
Like JIATF-South and SOF high-
value target teams, the JICTC needs to 
encourage and promote collaboration 
between its partners. Without 
collaboration, it cannot accomplish 
its organizational objective. The sub-
functions can be found below.
Build Long Term Relationships 
with Partners: The JICTC concept 
must be socialized among the 
interagency and international 
participants who may contribute to 
the success of the organization.
Assess Current Nation Building 
Efforts: JICTC will develop a baseline 
to determine the need for existing 
and/or planned counter traffi cking 
support efforts.
Synchronize Current and Future 
Nation Building Efforts: JICTC 
will assist in coordinating and 
synchronizing interagency and 
international capacity building efforts 
to maximize the effects of the overall 
resource pool.
4.3.3. Maintain Common 
Operational Picture
In order to be cognizant of all 
nation building activities occurring 
in the USEUCOM AOR, the JICTC 
will need to maintain a common 
operational picture (COP). The 
process of maintaining the COP is 
similar to the intelligence gathering 
functions found in JIATF-South and 
SOF high-value target teams in the 
sense that information needs to be 
gathered, processed, and distributed. 
The required sub-functions are 
described below.
Promote Networking of 
Information: JICTC will establish 
lines of communication so that 
information can be shared effi ciently 
and effectively with all partners.
Receive and Process Partner 
Information: Raw information will 
be collected, collated, and translated 
from partners. New information 
will be processed for signifi cance, 
integrated with previous information, 
and interpreted to determine the 
signifi cance of any newly developed 
knowledge. Once completed, a fi nal 
information product is created.
Disseminate Partner Information: 
The fi nished information product is 
distributed to decision makers and 
relevant parties for them to determine 
the next course of action.
4.3.4. Improve Organization
Like JIATF-South and SOF high-
value target teams, the JICTC must 
have some sort of capability and 
organizational fl exibility to allow 
for process improvement. The sub-
functions listed below are similar to 
those of JIATF-South and SOF high-
value target teams.
Accept Organizational Feedback: 
JICTC must continually seek feedback 
on how it conducts intelligence and 
operations missions.
Review Feedback: JICTC 
will analyze and review feedback 
(lessons learned) in order to 
develop improvements that address 
any identifi ed shortcomings or 
ineffi ciencies
Implement Feedback: 
Improvements that have been 
developed need to be implemented 
in a timely manner.
5. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The physical architecture is 
“a hierarchical description of the 
resources that comprise the system” 
[12]. It provides resources for every 
function identifi ed in the functional 
architecture. Resources include the 
people, equipment, tools, tactics, 
techniques, policies, and procedures 
needed for the system to function. 
By analyzing how JIATF-South 
and SOF high-value target teams are 
actually physically organized and 
resourced, signifi cant components 
necessary for successful interagency 
coordination can be identifi ed. 
The relevant components can then 
be organized to form a physical 
architecture of the JICTC based on 
its mission and requirements.
5.1. JIATF-South
JIATF-South is organized into 
seven different directorates under 
the direction of a command group 
[13]. Each directorate, described 
below, fulfi lls a specifi c role in the 
organization and some provide 
unique assets to help JIATF-South 
accomplish its mission. 
The J1/J8 directorate is 
responsible for oversight of 
manpower, personnel, resources, 
and administration functions for all 
personnel stationed at JIATF-South. 
The J2 directorate supports 
JIATF-South with reliable and timely 
intelligence information. It provides 
appropriate prioritization, indications, 
and warnings for decision makers 
based on intelligence information.
The J3 directorate oversees the 
day-to-day operations by providing 
direction, control, and tasking of 
maritime and air assets that are under 
the tactical control of JIATF-South 
or partner agencies.
The J4 directorate facilitates 
movement of mission critical 
components to JIATF-South assets. It 
uses all available logistics resources 
to maintain high levels operational 
readiness and effectiveness.
The J5 directorate develops 
policy, strategy, and long term plans 
with interagency and international 
partners for the purpose of building 
additional resources and capabilities.
The J6 directorate provides and 
maintains the critical communications 
paths with partner agencies and 
nations. These paths enable both 
planning and operations to be 
conducted from JIATF-South. 
Within the directorates, there 
are physical sub-elements which 
contribute greatly to the success of 
the organization. Two of these are 
listed below.
Tactical Analysis Teams: Under 
the direction of the J2, Tactical 
Analysis Teams (TATs) are JIATF-
South liaison offi cers embedded 
with Embassy Country Teams in 
South America. These teams are 
permanently located inside American 
Embassies or Consulates and work 
side-by-side supporting the in-
country law enforcement agency 
attachés. In total, approximately 10 
percent of the JIATF-South staff 
is actually overseas serving in one 
of twenty TATs [14]. They are able 
to gain unique insights about the 
cultural and political aspects of the 
host nation. 
Communications Infrastructures: 
The J6 at JIATF-South manages 
the vast array of communications 
networks including the Cooperating 
Nations Information Exchange 
System (CNIES). CNIES is composed 
of three major components:
1. Partner Nation Network – An 
information portal that allows partner 
nations to immediately publish and 
share information via machine based 
simultaneous translations and a 
common repository [15].
2. Command and Control Personal 
Computer – An unclassifi ed COP 
where surface and air tracks of interest 
are fi ltered and transmitted to partner 
nations, thus providing them with 
better situational awareness [16].
3. SPARK Chat – A chat program 
with built in real time Spanish-
English translation protocols which 
allows JIATF-South and partner 
nations to communicate in a chat 
environment [17].
5.2. SOF High-Value 
Target Teams
SOF high-value target teams were 
organized into two main entities: the 
SOF operators and the Intelligence 
Fusion Cell [19]. The typical U.S. 
Army Special Forces team consists 
of twelve men: a leader, a second 
in command, and two men for 
each of the fi ve specialty areas 
(weapons, engineering, medical, 
communications, and operations/
intelligence). Other SOF units include 
U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers 
and U.S. Army Rangers.
The Intelligence Fusion Cells 
were responsible for the fusion of all-
source intelligence with operations. 
Unlike conventional military forces, 
who keep intelligence and operations 
planning separate, SOF high-value 
target teams integrated analysts with 
operators to ensure that there was a 
seamless transition between tracking 
and acting on a target. Additionally, 
Tactical Human Intelligence Teams 
accompanied SOF operators on 
missions to assist in gathering 
raw intelligence and interrogating 
suspects. Any new information 
could then be quickly processed into 
actionable information to be acted 
upon immediately. 
5.3. JICTC
JICTC should be organized by 
the J-Code structure similar to that 
of JIATF-South. By having the 
directorates named according to 
standard U.S. military convention, 
JICTC is able to quickly integrate 
itself with USEUCOM and other 
partner organizations. However, 
in order to be a true interagency 
organization, the command structure 
of the JICTC should not be all 
military personnel. Representatives 
from partner agencies should be 
integrated in various positions up 
and down the chain of command. 
Figure 3 illustrates a notional 
organizational structure of the 
JICTC as proposed by the author.
The JICTC should make full use 
of the JIATF-South TAT concept. 
The concept behind TATs can also 
be found in the SOF high-value 
target teams. The Tactical Human 
Intelligence Teams worked side-by-
side with the operators on missions to 
gather and process intelligence in the 
fi eld. These two examples illustrate 
how important it is to have analysts 
“out on the front lines” working with 
partner agencies. 
Figure 3: JICTC Physical Architecture
By embedding its own personnel 
in embassy teams, the JICTC will 
have open and unfi ltered access to 
partner information. This concept 
is a much less obtrusive solution to 
gathering information than to have 
each partner report their activities to 
the JICTC. These embedded teams 
place the burden of information 
gathering and reporting on the JICTC 
instead of on the partners.   
With so many different countries 
and languages used in the AOR, 
the JICTC will need to establish 
common communications networks 
and protocols. Networking systems 
such as CNIES are useful tools 
that can increase collaboration and 
productivity. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
The notional architectures of JICTC 
and JIATF-South are understandably 
similar, as both organizations were 
created to coordinate various government 
agencies in countering illicit traffi cking. 
However, JIATF-South is centered 
around using interagency and partner 
nation coordination to strengthen its 
“detection and monitoring” mission in 
support of law enforcement, while JICTC 
utilizes interagency coordination to 
identify capability gaps and synchronize 
nation building efforts.
An important takeaway from the 
analysis of JIATF-South and SOF high-
value target teams was their common use 
of embedded intelligence analysts. The 
TATs from JIATF-South and Tactical 
Human Intelligence Teams on the 
SOF high-value target teams provided 
an organic intelligence processing 
capability “out on the front lines”. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
this research only addresses the top level 
functions and physical components 
of interagency coordination. Further 
work can be conducted regarding the 
use of actual trade studies and analyses 
needed to create a allocated architecture. 
Additionally, as the JICTC has 
already gained operational capability, 
opportunities exist to examine how it 
is currently organized as compared to 
the notional architecture outlined in 
this thesis. Opportunities also exist to 
examine other interagency organizations 
using a similar Systems Engineering 
methodology.
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